On the Nature of Fair Behavior
通过最后通牒博弈实验发现，相同的出价因提案人可选的替代方案不同而产生不同的拒绝率，挑战了仅以结果定义效用的传统经济学观点，表明负向互惠行为不能完全由基于物质收益分配的公平模型解释。
This article shows that identical offers in an ultimatum game generate systematically different rejection rates depending on the other offers that are available to the proposer. This result casts doubt on the consequentialist practice in economics to define the utility of an action solely in terms of the consequences of the action irrespective of the set of alternatives. It means in particular that negatively reciprocal behavior cannot be fully captured by equity models that are exclusively based on preferences over the distribution of material payoffs.