Unemployment vs. Mismatch of Talents: Reconsidering Unemployment Benefits
构建了一个考虑双向事前异质性的均衡搜索匹配模型，发现失业救济金虽会减少就业，但能帮助工人找到合适工作，并通过校准解释了欧美劳动力市场在过去25年的差异。
We develop an equilibrium search-matching model with risk-neutral agents and two-sided ex-ante heterogeneity. Unemployment insurance has the standard effect of reducing employment, but also helps workers to get a suitable job. We show, through calibrations, how the mere difference on unemployment insurance, when countries experience a common skilled-biased technological shock, may result in differences in unemployment, productivity growth and wage inequality. These results are consistent with the contrasting performance of the labour market in Europe and the United States in the last twenty-five years. The model is used to address some political economy issues.