Debt Contracting on Management
研究发现贷款合同中的管理层变动限制条款让贷方在CEO离职前就拥有控制权，用于降低人力资本损失和替换不确定性带来的风险，从而影响管理层更替并提升公司业绩。
ABSTRACT Change of management restrictions (CMRs) in loan contracts give lenders explicit ex ante control rights over managerial retention and selection. This paper shows that lenders use CMRs to mitigate risks arising from CEO turnover, especially those related to the loss of human capital and replacement uncertainty, thereby providing evidence that human capital risk affects debt contracting. With a CMR in place, the likelihood of CEO turnover decreases by more than half, and future firm performance improves when retention frictions are important, suggesting that lenders can influence managerial turnover, even outside of default states, and help the borrower retain talent.