Political Economy in a Changing World
构建了一个分析制度动力学的通用框架，假设经济政治制度和个体类型可排序，且偏好与政治权力分布满足单交叉条件，证明了纯策略马尔可夫投票均衡的存在性与唯一性，并应用于研究极端主义威胁下的政治权利与镇压动态以及集体实验动态。
We provide a general framework for the analysis of institutional dynamics in an environment in which payoffs and political powers change stochastically. Assuming that economic and political institutions as well as individual types can be ordered, and preferences and the distribution of political power satisfy natural "single-crossing" (increasing differences) conditions, we prove existence of a pure-strategy Markov voting equilibrium, provide conditions for its uniqueness, and present a number of comparative static results. We then use this framework to study the dynamics of political rights and repression in the presence of threats from extremist groups and the dynamics of collective experimentation.