STRATEGIC ADVERTISING AND DIRECTED SEARCH
研究了在信息不完全可见且广告成本高昂的情况下，卖家如何通过定向广告引导买家搜索，发现广告强度与买卖比例呈非单调关系，且标价机制优于拍卖机制。
Imperfect observability and costly informative advertising are introduced into a standard directed search framework. Capacity‐constrained sellers send costly advertisements to direct buyers' uncoordinated search by specifying their location and terms of trade. We show that the equilibrium advertising intensity is nonmonotonic in the buyer–seller ratio. In addition, we also find that price posting dominates auctions since both mechanisms yield the same expected revenue, but the latter results in higher advertising expense. Finally, we find a positive comovement between market transparency and price for low market tightness when the measure of informed buyers is endogenous.