Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650–1913
利用1650-1913年欧洲面板数据，统计分析发现财政集权和有限政府体制比碎片化和专制体制带来显著更高的公共收入，且收入转折点与政治变革密切相关。
Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and public revenues in Europe from 1650 to 1913. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and limited regimes were associated with significantly higher revenues than fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also suggest close relationships between major turning points in revenue series and political transformations.