Shareholder Governance and CEO Compensation: The Peer Effects of Say on Pay
研究发现，当薪酬同行公司遭遇低支持率的股东薪酬投票后，该公司会降低CEO薪酬，这种效应通过学习和薪酬对标两种渠道传导。
Abstract We document that firms whose compensation peers experience weak say on pay votes reduce CEO compensation following those votes. Reductions reflect proxy adviser concerns about peers’ compensation contracts and are stronger when CEOs receive excess compensation, when they compete more closely with their weak-vote peers in the executive labor market, and when those peers perform well. Reductions occur following peers’ disclosures of revised pay and are proportional to those needed to retain firms’ relative positions in their peer groups. We conclude that the spillover effects of shareholder voting occur through both learning and compensation targeting channels. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.