Occupational hazards and social disability insurance
利用回顾性数据发现职业暴露显著影响伤残风险，并构建一般均衡模型分析社会伤残保险通过风险分担和职业再分配两个渠道影响福利，校准显示最优保险比精算公平保险提高福利6.3%。
Using retrospective data, we introduce evidence that occupational exposure significantly affects disability risk. Incorporating this into a general equilibrium model, social disability insurance (SDI) affects welfare through (i) the classic, risk-sharing channel and (ii) a new channel of occupational reallocation. Both channels can increase welfare, but at the optimal SDI they are at odds. Welfare gains from additional risk-sharing are reduced by overly incentivizing workers to choose risky occupations. In a calibration, optimal SDI increases welfare by 6.3% relative to actuarially fair insurance, mostly due to risk sharing.