Outsourcing Through Purchase Contracts and Firm Capital Structure
利用外包采购合同数据库，研究发现高估值、高盈利、人均附加值高的企业更可能通过采购合同外包，且外包决策与较低杠杆率相关，以缓解财务困境对关系专用性投资的潜在损失。
We examine firm and industry characteristics associated with outsourcing and the relation between outsourcing and capital structure using a unique database of outsourcing purchase contracts. We find that highly valued, profitable firms with high-value added per employee and suppliers farther away with higher competition are more likely to outsource using purchase contracts. In addition, we document that firms that operate in industries with more severe import penetration and fewer fixed assets are more likely to outsource using purchase contracts. Examining the outside purchase contract and leverage decisions, we find that the outsourcing decision is associated with less leverage. Our results are consistent with firms that choose to use purchase contracts using less leverage to mitigate the potential loss of relation-specific investments of contracting parties that can occur with financial distress or bankruptcy. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.