When Does Regulation Distort Costs? Lessons from Fuel Procurement in US Electricity Generation
研究了美国州级立法取消发电成本加成监管后，燃煤和燃气电厂燃料采购行为的变化，发现放松监管显著降低了燃煤价格，并转向更高效的煤矿和资本密集度较低的脱硫技术。
This paper evaluates changes in fuel procurement practices by coal-and gas-fired power plants in the United States following state-level legislation that ended cost-of-service regulation of electricity generation. I find that deregulated plants substantially reduce the price paid for coal (but not gas) and tend to employ less capital-intensive sulfur abatement techniques relative to matched plants that were not subject to any regulatory change. Deregulation also led to a shift toward more productive coal mines. I show how these results lend support to theories of asymmetric information, capital bias, and regulatory capture as important sources of regulatory distortion.