CEO Turnover–Performance Sensitivity in Private Firms
比较了上市公司与大型私营企业的CEO更替率及更替对业绩的敏感性，发现上市公司更替率更高且更敏感，但私营企业在更替后业绩改善更大，部分原因可能是投资者短视。
We compare chief executive officer (CEO) turnover in public and large private firms. Public firms have higher turnover rates and exhibit greater turnover–performance sensitivity (TPS) than private firms. When we control for pre-turnover performance, performance improvements are greater for private firms than for public firms. We investigate whether these differences are due to differences in quality of accounting information, the CEO candidate pool, CEO power, board structure, ownership structure, investor horizon, or certain unobservable differences between public and private firms. One factor contributing to public firms’ higher turnover rates and greater TPS appears to be investor myopia.