Outsourcing, information leakage, and consulting firms
用一个一般均衡模型分析存在信息泄露时企业在外包与内部生产之间的研发投资决策，发现信息泄露会导致外包市场集中，并解释管理咨询行业的市场结构特征。
I analyze the R&D investment of firms that decide between outsourcing and in‐house production when information leakage is present (contractors learn clients' technology and can diffuse it to competitors)in a general equilibrium model. Information leakage tends to concentrate the outsourcing market: despite the fact that the original market is competitive, when a market for information arises, it is monopolistic. If contractors do not have control of the information, the market splits into a set of high‐tech firms that never outsource and a set of low‐tech firms that always outsource. The equilibrium structure captures several features observable in the management consulting industry.