Do Compensation Consultants Enable Higher CEO Pay? A Disclosure Rule Change as a Separating Device
利用2009年美国SEC要求披露薪酬顾问费用的规则变化，研究发现该规则区分了利用顾问攫取股东租金与优化薪酬的公司，表明多服务顾问并非都有利益冲突，专业顾问也并非都维护股东价值。
We investigate the impact of a firm’s compensation consultant choice on executive compensation by examining shifts in consultant choice stemming from a 2009 U.S. Securities Exchange Commission requirement that firms disclose fees paid to compensation consultants for both consulting and other services. We show that the disclosure rule change acted as a separating device distinguishing firms likely to have used compensation consultants to extract rents from shareholders from firms that were likely to have used consultants to optimally set pay. We conclude that not all multiservice consultants are conflicted, while not all specialist consultants are guardians of shareholder value. Our study provides a more nuanced view of the association between compensation consultant choices and executive pay. This paper was accepted by Shiva Rajgopal, accounting.