INTIMIDATION: LINKING NEGOTIATION AND CONFLICT
研究了挑战者与资源持有者之间的谈判与冲突，发现谈判中不妥协可胁迫对方让步，且谈判失败概率总为正，多轮谈判会导致边缘政策。
Abstract A challenger wants a resource initially held by a defender, who can negotiate a settlement by offering to share the resource. If Challenger rejects, conflict ensues. During conflict, each player could be a tough type for whom fighting is costless. Therefore, nonconcession intimidates the opponent into conceding. Unlike in models where negotiations happen in the shadow of exogenously specified conflicts, offers made during negotiations determine how conflict unfolds if negotiations fail. In turn, how conflict is expected to unfold determines the players' negotiating positions. In equilibrium, negotiations always fail with positive probability, even if players face a high cost of conflict. Allowing multiple offers leads to brinkmanship—the only acceptable offer is the one made when conflict is imminent. If negotiations fail, conflict is prolonged and not duration dependent.