Strategic Disclosure of Risky Prospects: A Laboratory Experiment
通过市场实验，研究买家如何应对卖家选择性披露风险前景的两种可能结果，发现买家对单方面披露存在锚定效应，且对战略性披露的系统性折价，揭示了认知局限在战略环境中的可被利用性。
In a market experiment, buyers respond to sellers' disclosures of one of the two potential outcomes of a risky prospect. Buyer reactions reflect two separate disclosure phenomena that heretofore have not been considered jointly. First, consistent with cognitive predictions that users tend to anchor on explicit one-sided disclosures, buyers pay more relative to expected value when the seller discloses the higher of the two potential outcomes than when the seller discloses the lower potential outcome. Second, consistent with the incentive-driven predictions of information economics, buyers systematically discount bids when sellers choose which potential outcome they wish to disclose, relative to bids in a control condition in which the seller is constrained to disclose randomly. Both findings are robust to each other, addressing qualifications in prior research about generalizing cognitive disclosure phenomena to a strategic disclosure environment. One implication supported by the data is that if cognitive information processing limitations are robust to a strategic environment, then strategic agents can exploit these limitations when choosing disclosures.