Compensation in the Post‐FIN 48 Period: The Case of Contracting on Tax Performance and Uncertainty
利用FIN 48号准则要求的新披露数据，研究董事会是否在绩效薪酬中考虑税收不确定性，发现奖金与税收绩效正相关，但事前不确定性高时奖金更低，且准则实施后奖金与现金有效税率关联显著。
Abstract Academic and anecdotal evidence indicates that incentive systems often provide short‐term payouts without regard for long‐term consequences. New detailed disclosures mandated by FIN No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, enable us to use a tax setting to investigate whether boards adjust performance‐based pay for uncertainty. We find managers’ bonus payouts are positively associated with tax performance; however, bonus payouts are lower when measures of ex ante tax uncertainty are higher. Our results are robust to tests of alternative explanations including financial reporting aggressiveness, overall firm risk, and other forms of compensation. Further, we document that the relation between bonus compensation and tax performance has changed in the post‐ FIN No. 48 period. Specifically, we identify a significant association between bonus payout and GAAP ETR only in the pre‐ FIN No. 48 period and a significant association between bonus payout and cash ETR only in the post‐ FIN No. 48 period, suggesting that the relation between compensation and tax avoidance should be examined carefully with particular attention to the post‐ FIN No. 48 period.