Performance responses to competition across skill levels in rank‐order tournaments: field evidence and implications for tournament design
基于755场软件算法开发锦标赛中2775名选手的随机分配数据，发现不同能力选手对新增竞争者的表现反应呈非单调变化，多数选手反应消极而顶尖选手反应积极，并通过反事实模拟评估了多种锦标赛设计政策的效果。
Tournaments are widely used in the economy to organize production and innovation. We study individual data on 2775 contestants in 755 software algorithm development contests with random assignment. The performance response to added contestants varies nonmonotonically across contestants of different abilities, precisely conforming to theoretical predictions. Most participants respond negatively, whereas the highest‐skilled contestants respond positively. In counterfactual simulations, we interpret a number of tournament design policies (number of competitors, prize allocation and structure, number of divisions, open entry) and assess their effectiveness in shaping optimal tournament outcomes for a designer.