Outsourcing Mutual Fund Management: Firm Boundaries, Incentives, and Performance
研究发现，基金家族将大量基金外包给咨询公司管理，这些基金每年比内部管理的基金表现差约52个基点，且外包基金面临更强激励，更易因业绩差或风险过高而被关闭。
ABSTRACT We investigate the effects of managerial outsourcing on the performance and incentives of mutual funds. Fund families outsource the management of a large fraction of their funds to advisory firms. These funds underperform those run internally by about 52 basis points per year. After instrumenting for a fund's outsourcing status, the estimated underperformance is three times larger. We hypothesize that contractual externalities due to firm boundaries make it difficult to extract performance from an outsourced relationship. Consistent with this view, outsourced funds face higher powered incentives; they are more likely to be closed after poor performance and excessive risk‐taking.