Labour-Market Matching with Precautionary Savings and Aggregate Fluctuations
研究了一个包含劳动力市场摩擦和不完全市场的模型，分析了失业保险对消费平滑和就业的影响，发现提高保险虽有利于消费但会抑制企业进入，且生产率变化对失业影响有限。
We analyse a Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari incomplete-markets model with labour-market frictions. Consumers are subject to idiosyncratic employment shocks against which they cannot insure directly. The labour market has a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides structure: firms enter by posting vacancies and match with workers bilaterally, with match probabilities given by an aggregate matching function. Wages are determined through Nash bargaining. We also consider aggregate productivity shocks and a complete set of contingent claims conditional on this risk. We use the model to evaluate a tax-financed unemployment insurance scheme. Higher insurance is beneficial for consumption smoothing, but because it raises workers' outside option value, it discourages firm entry. We find that the latter effect is more potent for welfare outcomes; we tabulate the effects quantitatively for different kinds of consumers. We also demonstrate that productivity changes in the model—in steady state as well as stochastic ones—generate rather limited unemployment effects, unless workers are close to indifferent between working and not working; thus, recent findings are corroborated in our more general setting.