Corporate Governance and Risk‐Taking
利用跨国面板和美国样本，发现更好的投资者保护会促使企业承担更多风险，并促进企业增长，对研究公司治理与风险决策的学者有参考价值。
ABSTRACT Better investor protection could lead corporations to undertake riskier but value‐enhancing investments. For example, better investor protection mitigates the taking of private benefits leading to excess risk‐avoidance. Further, in better investor protection environments, stakeholders like creditors, labor groups, and the government are less effective in reducing corporate risk‐taking for their self‐interest. However, arguments can also be made for a negative relationship between investor protection and risk‐taking. Using a cross‐country panel and a U.S.‐only sample, we find that corporate risk‐taking and firm growth rates are positively related to the quality of investor protection.