Moral hazard, adverse selection, and health expenditures: A semiparametric analysis
提出一种两步半参数估计方法，用于区分医疗保险市场中的道德风险和逆向选择，并利用大型自保雇主的理赔数据发现两者均显著存在。
Theoretical models predict asymmetric information in health insurance markets may generate inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral hazard. However, previous empirical research has found it difficult to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in health care consumption. We propose a two‐step semiparametric estimation strategy to identify and estimate a canonical model of asymmetric information in health care markets. With this method, we can estimate a structural model of demand for health care. We illustrate this method using a claims‐level data set with confidential information from a large self‐insured employer. We find significant evidence of moral hazard and adverse selection.