The Economic Consequences of IPO Spinning
研究了1996-2000年间56家IPO公司高管从主承销商获得热门新股配售（即“配售”）的经济后果，发现这些公司首日回报更高、后续更换承销商概率更低，表明配售影响了公司决策。
Using a sample of fifty-six companies going public in 1996--2000 in which top executives received allocations of other hot initial public offerings (IPOs) from the bookrunner, a practice known as spinning, we examine the consequences of spinning. The fifty-six IPOs had first-day returns that were, on average, 23% higher than similar IPOs. The profits collected by these executives were only a small fraction of the incremental amount of money left on the table by their companies when they went public. These companies were dramatically less likely to switch investment bankers in a follow-on offer: only 6% of issuers whose executives were spun switched underwriters, whereas 31% of other issuers switched. These findings suggest that the spinning of executives accomplished its goal of affecting corporate decisions. The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.