Partial Deregulation and Competition: Effects on Risky Mortgage Origination
利用美国货币监理署对全国银行放松州级反掠夺性贷款法的准实验，研究发现放松管制后全国银行增加了含提前还款罚金的贷款发放，且非受监管银行通过提供不受限制的高风险合同（如递延摊销）来竞争，并用低初始利率吸引借款人。
We exploit the preemption of national banks from state laws against predatory lending by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) as a quasi-experiment to study the effect of deregulation and its interaction with competition on the supply of complex mortgages. Following the preemption ruling, national banks significantly increased their origination of loans with prepayment penalties relative to national banks in states without anti-predatory-lending laws. We highlight a competition channel: in counties where OCC-regulated lenders had larger market shares, non-OCC-regulated lenders responded by increasing their supply of contracts with riskier features, such as deferred amortization, which were not restricted by the state anti-predatory-lending law. Non-OCC lenders were able to lure borrowers into these higher-margin contracts by increasing their appeal with teaser rates. This paper was accepted by Tyler Shumway, finance.