To Comply or Not to Comply: Understanding the Discretion in Reporting Public Float and SEC Regulations
研究了企业如何通过定义关联方和报告公众持股量来行使自由裁量权，以应对SEC规定，发现合规成本高和股权发行动机影响报告行为。
Abstract This paper documents how firms exercise discretion in defining affiliates and reporting public float in response to Securities and Exchange Commission regulations. I find that firms with higher expected compliance costs under section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 tend to classify more shares as affiliated and report lower public float. In contrast, firms issuing seasoned equity are less likely to underreport public float, possibly due to favorable regulatory treatment for large issuers. These incentives are weakened when future regulatory changes render float less important.