The effect of entry on R&D networks
研究了潜在进入者如何影响现有企业的研发网络形成与稳定性，发现市场与社会激励常不一致，并提出了促进福利改善的补贴方案。
Abstract We investigate the effect of potential entry on the formation and stability of R&D networks considering farsighted firms. The presence of a potential entrant often alters the incentives of incumbents to collaborate. Incumbent firms may form an otherwise undesirable collaboration to deter entry of a new firm. Moreover, an incumbent may refrain from establishing an otherwise desirable collaboration, expecting to form a more profitable link with the entrant. Finally, potential entry may lead an inefficient incumbent to exit the market. Welfare analysis shows market and social incentives to be often misaligned. We propose a subsidy scheme that encourages welfare‐improving entry.