Countercyclical Bank Equity Issuance
研究发现1980-2012年间美国大型商业银行在信贷扩张期发行和留存更少股权，加剧杠杆，原因在于政府担保削弱了债权人市场纪律，对德国州立银行的实证支持了这一解释。
Abstract Over the period 1980–2012, large U.S. commercial banks raise and retain less equity during credit expansions, which amplifies their leverage. The decrease in equity issuance is large relative to subsequent banking losses. I consider a variety of explanations for why banks resist raising equity and find evidence consistent with the diminishment of creditor market discipline due to government guarantees. I test this explanation by analyzing the removal of government guarantees to German Landesbank creditors and find that creditor market discipline and equity issuance increase. These findings help explain why banks resist raising equity, making financial distress more likely. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.