Bargaining, Bundling, and Clout: The Portfolio Effects of Horizontal Mergers
研究差异化上游企业横向合并后，能否捆绑销售对产出、利润和福利的影响。若合并后能捆绑，转移定价有效，福利不变；若不能且议价能力高，转移定价失效，福利通常下降。
We examine the output and profit effects of horizontal mergers between differentiated upstream firms in an intermediate-goods market served by a downstream monopolist. If the merged firm can bundle, transfer pricing is efficient before and after the merger. Absent cost efficiencies, consumer and total welfare do not change. If the merged firm cannot bundle and its bargaining power is sufficiently high, transfer pricing is inefficient after the merger. Absent cost efficiencies, welfare typically falls. We evaluate the profit effects of mergers for the case of two-part tariff contracts. Rival firms gain (lose) from mergers that raise (lower) downstream prices. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a merger that harms the retailer may increase welfare.