Community Structure and Market Outcomes: A Repeated Games-in-Networks Approach
研究大型市场中买卖双方网络关系对合作的影响，发现适度竞争、稀疏性和隔离性有助于维持合作，但激励约束会排除有效网络。
Consider a large market with asymmetric information, in which sellers have the option to “cheat” their buyers, and buyers decide whether to repurchase from different sellers. We model active trade relationships as links in a buyer-seller network and study repeated games in such networks. Endowing sellers with incomplete knowledge of the network, we derive conditions that determine whether a network is consistent with cooperation between every buyer and seller that are connected. Three network features reduce the minimal discount factor sufficient for cooperation: moderate and balanced competition, sparseness, and segregation. Incentive constraints are binding and rule out efficient networks.