Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction‐Theoretic Approach
用拍卖理论框架分析对称诉讼环境，法院根据案件质量判给资产，理性诉讼人通过雇佣律师影响案件质量，比较英美法系、大陆法系等不同诉讼制度下的均衡法律支出。
A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case. Rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skilful attorneys. This framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under a continuum of legal systems. The British rule, Continental rule, American rule, and some recently proposed legal reforms are special cases of our model.