Risk Sharing, Sorting, and Early Contracting
研究参与者在能力不确定的分配市场中，如何通过早期签约平衡风险分担与分类效率，发现更有前景的代理人可能提前签约，而较差的则等待，并分析了这种均衡对各方福利的影响。
In an assignment market with uncertainty regarding productive ability of participants, early contracting can occur as participants balance risk sharing and sorting efficiency. More promising agents may contract early with each other because insurance gains outweigh sorting inefficiency, whereas less promising agents wait. It can also happen in equilibrium that more promising job applicants contract early with less promising firms. Such worker-driven equilibria may arise when applicants are more risk-averse, have greater uncertainty regarding their quality, or face a tighter market and when production exhibits increasing returns to firms' qualities. Early contracting then unambiguously hurts the more promising firms that choose to wait.