Allocating Transmission to Mitigate Market Power in Electricity Networks
研究输电权分配如何影响发电商的市场势力，发现统一价格拍卖中获得的合同能缓解市场势力，而继承或按报价支付拍卖获得的合同可能增强市场势力，并探讨了网络结构的影响。
We ask under what conditions transmission contracts increase or mitigate market power.We show that the allocation process of transmission rights is crucial.In an efficiently arbitraged uniform price auction generators will only obtain contracts that mitigate their market power.However, if generators inherit transmission contracts or buy them in a 'pay-as-bid' auction, then these contracts can enhance market power.In the two-node network case banning generators from holding transmission contracts that do not correspond to delivery of their own energy mitigates market power.Meshed networks differ in important ways as constrained links no longer isolate prices in competitive markets from market manipulation.The paper suggests ways of minimising market power considerations when designing transmission contracts.