Incentives, wages, employment, and the division of labor in teams
研究了团队生产中激励、工资和就业的理论，发现专业化和劳动分工不仅提高生产率，还增加努力程度及激励对努力的敏感度，并分析了就业与激励的互补或替代关系。
We develop a theory of incentives, wages, and employment in the context of team production. A central insight is that specialization and division of labor not only improve productivity but also increase effort and the sensitivity of effort to incentives under moral hazard. We show that employment and incentives are complements for the principal when the positive effects of specialization and division of labor outweigh the increase in risk associated with additional employment and are substitutes otherwise. We provide new characterizations of the partnership, the firm, and the role of the budget‐breaker that are quite different from the classical literature.