A Theory of Patent Portfolios
研究了企业积累大量相关专利形成专利组合的现象，发现产品市场竞争弱且专利组合强度适中或相当时会形成专利和平，大组合企业更有动力获取新专利，但消费者可能从小企业获得专利中受益。
This paper develops a theory of patent portfolios in which firms accumulate an enormous amount of related patents, which makes it impractical to develop new products that avoid inadvertent infringement. We show that patent peace arises if product market competition is weak and patent portfolios are either sufficiently weak or sufficiently strong with comparable size. An increase in one firm's patent portfolio reduces the innovation incentives of its rivals but does not necessarily increase its own. Firms with larger patent portfolios have stronger incentives to acquire additional patents, while consumers may be better off if firms with weaker portfolios acquire them.