Can Strong Creditors Inhibit Entrepreneurial Activity?
利用美国各州分阶段采用现代欺诈性转让法的情况，研究发现加强无担保债权人权利会降低新企业进入率、增加现有企业关闭，并促使企业家减少杠杆，表明强债权人保护可能抑制小企业的风险承担和创业活动。
Abstract We examine entrepreneurial activity following the staggered adoption of modern-day fraudulent transfer laws in the United States. These laws strengthen unsecured creditors’ rights and are particularly important for entrepreneurs whose personal assets commingle with the firm’s. Using administrative data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we document declines in startup entry—particularly among riskier entrants—and closures of existing firms after these laws pass. Firm financial data shows that entrepreneurs lower leverage by reducing demand for unsecured credit. Our results suggest that strong creditor protections can limit entrepreneurs’ appetite for risk, which may reduce churning along the extensive margin among the smallest firms in the economy.