Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction
这篇导论介绍了动态机制设计的最新进展，重点讨论准线性情形下的社会最优机制和收益最优机制，适合想了解动态环境如何影响拍卖与机制设计的学者。
We provide an introduction to the recent developments of dynamic mechanism design, with a primary focus on the quasilinear case. First, we describe socially optimal (or efficient) dynamic mechanisms. These mechanisms extend the well-known Vickrey– Clark–Groves and D’Aspremont–Gérard–Varet mechanisms to a dynamic environment. Second, we discuss revenue optimal mechanisms. We cover models of sequential screening and revenue-maximizing auctions with dynamically changing bidder types. We also discuss models of information management where the mechanism designer can control (at least partially) the stochastic process governing the agents’ types. Third, we consider models with changing populations of agents over time. After discussing related models with risk-averse agents and limited liability, we conclude with a number of open questions and challenges that remain for the theory of dynamic mechanism design.