Initial Shareholdings and Overbidding in Takeover Contests
研究收购中部分持股竞标者的最优策略，发现其会过度出价（出价高于估值），这可能导致效率低下和赢家净损失，且大股东的存在会提高溢价但降低收购成功率。
Within the context of takeovers, this paper shows that in private-value auctions the optimal individually rational strategy for a bidder with partial ownership of the item is to overbid, i.e., to bid more than his valuation. This strategy, however, can lead to i) an inefficient outcome, and ii) the winning bidder making a net loss. Further, the overbidding result implies that the presence of a large shareholder increases the bid premium in single-bidder takeovers at the expense of reducing the probability of the takeover actually occurring.