Organizational Design, Competition, and Financial Exchanges
研究了证券服务行业中纵向与横向整合的激励，发现分散决策可能导致低效的纵向整合均衡，而横向整合虽能避免私人低效，但从社会角度看仍不足。
Abstract We investigate the incentives for vertical and horizontal integration in the financial securities service industry. In a model with two exchanges and two central securities depositories (CSDs), we find that decentralized decisions might lead to privately and socially inferior industry equilibria with vertical integration of both CSDs with their respective exchanges. Allowing for horizontal integration of CSDs avoids privately inferior industry equilibria. However, we observe too little horizontal integration from the social perspective. We link our results to recent regulatory and institutional developments such as the emergence of multilateral trading facilities, over‐the‐counter regulation, and financial harmonization.