Incentives for experimenting agents
研究了委托人与进行实验的代理人之间的重复互动，发现动态代理成本导致委托人降低项目续存价值，有效均衡在初期集中努力后切换至最差续存均衡。
We examine a repeated interaction between an agent who undertakes experiments and a principal who provides the requisite funding. A dynamic agency cost arises—the more lucrative the agent's stream of rents following a failure, the more costly are current incentives, giving the principal a motivation to reduce the project's continuation value. We characterize the set of recursive Markov equilibria. Efficient equilibria front‐load the agent's effort, inducing maximum experimentation over an initial period, until switching to the worst possible continuation equilibrium. The initial phase concentrates effort near the beginning, when most valuable, whereas the switch attenuates the dynamic agency cost.