Do Informational Frictions Justify Federal Credit Programs?
通过两个私人信息模型评估政府信贷计划的效果，发现直接贷款和贷款担保可能恶化市场，而鼓励二级市场的计划仅在特定监管下有益。
Two credit market models with private information are used here to evaluate the effectiveness of government credit programs. In a model with costly state verification, direct government lending and government loan guarantees at best have no effect, and at worst make all agents worse off by increasing (decreasing) interest rates faced by borrowers (lenders) and increasing the amount of rationing in the loan market. In an adverse selection model with costly screening of borrowers, government lending influences credit allocation by affecting borrowers' incentives to misreport type. Government programs to encourage secondary markets in private loans are welfare improving only when there are regulations which inhibit diversification by private financial intermediaries. Copyright 1994 by Ohio State University Press.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)