CEO Inside Debt and Accounting Conservatism
研究发现CEO持有更多内部债务（养老金和递延薪酬）的公司，其财务报告稳健性更低，尤其在违约风险高和债务代理成本高的公司中，因为内部债务缓解了债权人对被侵占的担忧，降低了对会计稳健性的需求。
ABSTRACT We examine the relation between accounting conservatism and inside debt held by managers in the form of pension benefits and deferred compensation. We find that financial reporting is less conservative in firms whose CEOs hold more inside debt, particularly in firms with high default risk and agency costs of debt. This is consistent with our hypothesis that by aligning managerial incentives more closely with those of debtholders, inside debt reduces debtholders’ expropriation concerns and thus their demand for accounting conservatism. Our results are robust to identification strategies addressing the endogeneity of CEO inside debt and to alternative measures of accounting conservatism.