EFFECTIVE EUROPEAN ANTITRUST: DOES EC MERGER POLICY GENERATE DETERRENCE?
研究1990-2009年欧盟合并政策工具的威慑效应，发现第一阶段补救措施能有效减少后续合并申报，尤其在高度集中行业，且不会阻碍明显促进竞争的合并。
We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990–2009 period. Our empirical results suggest phase‐1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as—unlike phase‐1 withdrawals, phase‐2 remedies, and preventions—phase‐1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase‐1 remedies work best in high‐concentration industries, that is, industries where the Herfindahl Hirschman Index is above the 0.2 cut‐off level employed by the EC. Additionally, we find phase‐1 remedies do not deter clearly pro‐competitive mergers, but do deter potentially anti‐competitive mergers in high‐concentration industries.