Contracting out public service provision to not-for-profit firms
在不完全契约框架下，比较营利与非营利企业提供公共服务的效率，发现非营利企业可能过度投资于质量改进，但在特定条件下能带来更高社会福利，且公私合作模式扩大了非营利企业的优势空间。
In an incomplete-contract setting, we analyse the contracting out of public service provision, comparing the performance of for-profit (FP) and not-for-profit (NP) firms. Two institutional arrangements are considered, control rights lying either with the firm (PPP) or the government (traditional procurement). We show that provision by an NP may be associated with overinvestment in quality improvement, but that under conditions that restrain this overinvestment, the NP may yield greater welfare than obtains with FP-provision. Although none of the four possible arrangements is preferable under all conditions, the introduction of PPP has enhanced the scope for advantageous provision by an NP.