Peer Monitoring, Syndication, and the Dynamics of Venture Capital Interactions: Theory and Evidence
构建理论模型解释风险资本辛迪加的形成原因，分析企业家选择单一风投、多个风投或辛迪加融资的均衡，发现辛迪加能缓解风投在增值服务中的道德风险，并用数据验证模型预测。
We develop a theoretical model providing a new rationale for venture capitalist (VC) syndicate formation and empirically test our model predictions. An entrepreneur obtains financing and two different value-adding inputs from a single VC or from two different VCs, each operating in his area of expertise. We characterize the entrepreneur’s equilibrium choice between contracting with a single VC, individually with multiple VCs, or with a VC syndicate. We show that syndicates mitigate VCs’ moral hazard problem in value addition. We also analyze the dynamics of VC syndicate composition. The results of our empirical analysis are consistent with our model’s predictions.