How Effective Are Monetary Incentives to Vote? Evidence from a Nationwide Policy
利用秘鲁全国性改革中罚款金额的边际变化，发现降低罚款会减少投票率，但主要通过增加空白或无效选票，对代表性影响不大；非金钱激励才是强制投票有效的主因。
We study voters’ response to marginal changes to the fine for electoral abstention in Peru, leveraging variation from a nationwide reform. A smaller fine has a robust, negative effect on voter turnout, partly through irregular changes in voter registration. However, representation is largely unaffected, as most of the lost votes are blank or invalid. We also show that the effect of an exemption from compulsory voting is substantially larger than that of a full fine reduction, suggesting that nonmonetary incentives are the main drivers behind the effectiveness of compulsory voting.