Investor Reactions to CEOs' Inside Debt Incentives
研究了2007年美国证监会披露改革后，股东和债券持有人对公司首次报告CEO内部债务头寸的反应，发现CEO持有大量内部债务时债券价格上涨、股价下跌，企业风险降低但整体价值受损。
Pensions and deferred compensation represent substantial components of CEO incentives. We study stockholder and bondholder reactions to companies' initial reports of CEOs' inside debt positions following a 2007 SEC disclosure reform. We find that bond prices rise, equity prices fall, and the volatility of both securities drops for firms whose CEOs have sizeable defined benefit pensions or deferred compensation. Similar changes occur for credit default swap spreads and exchange-traded options. The results indicate a reduction in firm risk, a transfer of value from equity toward debt, and an overall destruction of enterprise value when CEOs' inside debt holdings are large. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.