Optimal Standards of Negligence When One Party Is Uninformed of the Standards
分析了当未来两方中只有一方知悉过失标准时，法院如何设定最优责任规则，发现最优规则取决于谁先行动以及谁是加害人。
This article analyzes optimal negligence standards when only one of two (future) parties will be informed of the standards. When the informed party is the injurer and acts first, the simple negligence rule is optimal, and under certain conditions, the first best standard of due care is optimal. The informed party will have an incentive to comply with the standard due to the discontinuity of the negligence rule, whereas the uninformed party may infer this and hence also take appropriate precautions. In general, the optimal policy for the court depends on who acts first and on who the injurer is. Thus, optimal rules are contributory negligence when the informed party is the victim and acts first, no liability when the uninformed party is the injurer and acts first, and strict liability without contributory negligence when the uninformed party is the victim and acts first.