Inefficiency in Legislative Policymaking: A Dynamic Analysis
构建了一个无限期模型，研究立法谈判如何决定公共支出与税收政策，分析生产性投资与分配性转移之间的权衡，并探讨稳态下税收与支出配置的效率问题。
This paper develops an infinite horizon model of public spending and taxation in which policy decisions are determined by legislative bargaining. The policy space incorporates both productive and distributive public spending and distortionary taxation. The productive spending is investing in a public good that benefits all citizens (e.g., national defense or air quality) and the distributive spending is district-specific transfers (e.g., pork barrel spending). Investment in the public good creates a dynamic linkage across policy-making periods. The analysis explores the dynamics of legislative policy choices, focusing on the efficiency of the steady state level of taxation and allocation of tax revenues. The model sheds new light on the efficiency of legislative policy-making and has a number of novel positive implications.