A, B or C? Experimental Tests of IPO Mechanisms
通过实验比较四种IPO机制（统一拍卖、累计投标、Ausubel拍卖和竞争性IPO），发现竞争性IPO能减少抑价并促进信息揭示，Ausubel拍卖在价格发现上优于统一拍卖和累计投标，为设计混合型发行机制提供了启示。
Abstract Empirical research has provided extensive evidence on the inefficiency of bookbuilding in controlling underpricing. Both academics and practitioners have investigated this phenomenon proposing innovative offering methodologies. In this paper we explore the information revelation and underpricing properties of two baseline models, uniform auctions and bookbuilding, and two newly proposed mechanisms, Ausubel auction and Competitive IPO. Our findings confirm the empirical weaknesses of bookbuilding and provide hints that standard auctions may stimulate less bidding. However, (a) the Competitive IPO features increase competition both among banks and among investors resulting in more information revelation and less underpricing than standard bookbuilding; and (b) the Ausubel auction yields superior price discovery and underpricing outcomes than uniform clock auction and bookbuilding. Our experimental results provide novel insights into the ongoing debate on optimal equity offering mechanisms, suggesting that the solution to current issuing methodologies shortcomings may require the development of a ‘hybrid’ procedure blending properties of existing and new mechanisms.