Venture Capitalists Versus Angels: The Dynamics of Private Firm Financing Contracts
研究了企业家在拥有私人信息时，如何与风险投资家或天使投资人签订两期融资合同，分析了融资稀缺性、努力投入对合同选择及动态演化的影响。
An entrepreneur, with private information about his firm, contracts over two periods with an outside financier, a venture capitalist (VC) or angel. The financier can reduce his information disadvantage by learning about the firm over time. VC financing is scarce relative to angel financing. Further, unlike an angel, a VC may exert effort, which, together with the entrepreneur’s effort, increases the firm’s success probability. The equilibrium VC financing contract ensures optimal effort-exertion by both entrepreneur and VC. We characterize the firm’s equilibrium choice between VC and angel financing, its equilibrium contractual provisions, and the dynamic evolution of its financing contract.