Credit Freezes, Equilibrium Multiplicity, and Optimal Bailouts in Financial Networks
分析了金融网络中相互依赖如何导致自我实现的破产和多重均衡，发现最优救助政策在核心-外围网络中优先救助外围银行，且利用间接收益可确保系统偿付能力，成本不超过总缺口的一半。
Abstract We analyze how interdependencies in financial networks can lead to self-fulfilling insolvencies and multiple possible equilibrium outcomes. Multiplicity arises if a certain type of dependency cycle exists in the network. We show that finding the cheapest bailout policy that prevents self-fulfilling insolvencies is computationally hard, but that the optimal policy has intuitive features in some typical network structures. Leveraging indirect benefits ensures systemic solvency at a cost that never exceeds half of the overall shortfall. In core-periphery networks, it is optimal to bail out peripheral banks first as opposed to core banks.